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THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LocHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman.

Durham: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $34.95.
The by now almost mythical Supreme Court decision in Lochner v.
New York 1 has long been the centerpiece of a series of debates over the
evils of judicial activism, the abuse of judicial power, and the legitimacy of substantive due process - debates that are still very much
alive today. 2 Lochner's symbolic significance has greatly transcended
whatever historical impact may have followed from the Court's decision to strike down a New York law that limited bakers' working
hours to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day. 3 The Lochner era has
come to represent a period in our constitutional history from roughly
1880 to 1937 when conservative Justices aggressively exceeded the
proper boundaries of their authority to interfere with the political
process.4
Many of those who have decried the abuses of this period have
taken the position articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his
famous Lochner dissent: that the majority decided the case "upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain"
and that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics." 5 These critics have portrayed the Justices in
the Lochner majority as being motivated by their own policy preferences favoring laissez-faire economics and social Darwinism. 6 By
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) ("The spec·
tre of Lachner has loomed over most important constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or
invalidate governmental practices.").
3. Although commentators generally agree that the Lachner era continued at least until
1937, when the Supreme Court drastically altered its approach to minimum-wage legislation in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the specific holding in Lachner was at least
implicitly overruled 20 years earlier in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding a
general law setting maximum work hours). For a detailed account of the factual background of
the Lachner litigation, conditions in New York City's baking industry, and passage of the New
York Bakeshop Act of 1895, see PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM PoLmCS: THE
ANATOMY OF LOCHNER Y. NEW YORK (1990).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT H. Boru::, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44 (1990) (stating that Lachner
is "the symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power"); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14 (1980) (stating that the Lachner cases "are now universally
acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper''); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW &
HISf. REv. 249, 250 (1987) (stating that Lachner "is still shorthand in constitutional law for the
worst sins of subjective judicial activism"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128 (1985) (defending the Lachner opinion).
5. Lachner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 520-22
(1943). For a recent statement to this effect, see FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 95 (1986) (stating that the "Justices of
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reading a guarantee of liberty of contract into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the critics continue, the Lochner
Court fraudulently interpreted the Constitution so as to protect the
interests of private property and to provide cover for its own act of
judicial legislation, as the Court substituted its policy preferences for
those of the legislature. Countering this neo-Holmesian interpretation
of the Lochner era, however, more recent scholars have proposed a
more complex picture of the underlying ideology motivating the Justices during this part of our nation's history. 7
In The Constitution Besieged, Howard Gillman8 builds on this stilldeveloping revisionist interpretation of the period to suggest an alternative image of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Gillman's account is
more historically grounded and more faithful to the jurisprudential
language employed by the state and federal courts of the time than
either the traditional or the early revisionist accounts. Instead of explaining the Lochner era in terms of personal policy preferences, Gillman argues that the decisions and opinions of this period represented a
"serious, principled effort" (p. 10) to maintain the coherence and integrity of a long-standing constitutional ideology that distinguished
between valid economic regulation and invalid "class," or factional,
legislation (pp. 10-11). Gillman premises his approach on the belief
that judicial opinions are not masks of empty rhetoric and that the
constitutional jurisprudence of this period- and legal ideology generally --offers a coherent means ofexplaining judicial behavior (pp. 1518). The author attempts to demonstrate how federal and state judges
shared a common method of evaluating state legislatures' exercise of
police powers based on an understanding of political legitimacy and
equality having its roots in the creation of the Constitution.
The Justices of the Lochner Court, Gillman contends, brought
about a crisis in American constitutionalism by stubbornly adhering to
this constitutional ideology - which was hyperantagonistic toward
"class" politics and legislation - despite the rapid industrialization
and transformation of American capitalist relations in this period.
While legislatures were attempting to extend unprecedented protections to those groups that had become vulnerable to the coercive forces
inherent in these new capitalist forms of production, the Supreme
Court was struggling to maintain an increasingly anachronistic constitutional ideology. In essence, Gillman suggests that the Justices simthe [Lochner Court], steeped in the economics of Adam Smith and the sociology of Herbert
Spencer, unabashedly read their philosophy into the Constitution").
7. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters ofLaissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST.
970, 973 (1975) (arguing that Justice Field derived his jurisprudence not so much from social
Darwinism as from the Jacksonian antislavery precept that an individual is free to pursue the
fruits of her labor as she sees fit).
8. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California.
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ply failed to perceive or acknowledge that profound changes in
American society had fatally undermined the theoretical underpinnings of their police powers jurisprudence.
Although Gillman offers The Constitution Besieged as a comprehensive account of the constitutional crisis that took place during the
Lochner era, the author's greatest contribution to the reinterpretation
of this period lies in his detailed account of the development of police
powers jurisprudence in state courts prior to the Lochner decision in
1905 and the manner in which the language and reasoning of the
Supreme Court opinions prior to and following Lochner reflect this
development. In his effort to present "evidence of the late-nineteenthcentury legal community's obsession with drawing distinctions between legitimate promotions of the public interest and illegitimate efforts to impose special burdens and benefits" (p. 9), however, Gillman
only rarely acknowledges that judges in this period did in fact believe
in something they called "liberty of contract" (p. 6). Nevertheless,
even though Gillman may be trying to prove too much, his history of
American police powers jurisprudence skillfully highlights the doctrine's antagonism to "class" or "partial" legislation and corresponding emphasis on equal rights and the need for police regulations to
provide general benefits.
Gillman's portrayal of the Lochner era is probably best understood, not as a complete refutation of the laissez-faire, liberty-of-contract model of the period, but rather as a deepening and broadening of
our understanding of these terms by placing them in their particular
American historical context. 9 After all, the key for any student of this
period is not merely to reject or attach labels like laissez-faire or liberty
of contract to judicial ideology but to understand why the courts at
times upheld, and at other times struck down, legislation that interfered with the free market. To this end, Gillman's contextual approach has much to add to our understanding of Lochner-era
constitutional jurisprudence.
Gillman begins his account by looking at the events and conditions
surrounding the framing of the U.S. Constitution. He points to the
familiar concern of the dominant social classes to prevent "factions"
from gaining political control. Specifically, Gillman highlights the
Framers' attempts to delegitimize certain kinds of "partial" laws
passed by state legislatures in the 1780s to advance, the Framers suggested, purely "private" interests, such as debtor-relief legislation and
wage and price controls, which only benefited a narrow segment or
class of society (pp. 26-33). The Framers sought to delegitimize these
9. P. 189 ("Still, 'liberty of contract' had come to represent the Court's general attitude that
market relationships should be free from government interference unless the legislature was promoting an acceptable public purpose ..•."); p. 114 ("Market freedom, or 'liberty of contract,'
was linked inextricably with the commitment to faction-free legislation.").
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partial laws by stressing the need for government to remain neutral in
the conflicts arising between social groups or classes competing in the
economy (p. 32). Government neutrality, Gillman contends, followed
from the Framers' underlying belief that "the market was essentially
harmonious and liberty loving" (p. 21). Moreover, Gillman suggests
that when the Framers first elaborated their principle of equality and
governmental impartiality in the 1780s, "its legitimacy rested specifically on the assumption that a commercial republic would not create
conditions of social dependency that could be used by vulnerable
groups to justify requests for special government protection and assistance" (p. 21).
At the center of republican ideology stood the image of the selfreliant or autonomous individual. Although he notes differences between groups such as the Liberal Whigs and the Philadelphian artisans, Gillman stresses that the dominant vision of Thomas Jefferson
and his followers held that America's expansive frontier would ensure
this individual self-reliance and allow the government to remain
"class-neutral" (p. 26). Gillman also indicates that he recognizes that
this period's faith in the "natural society" was far from neutral in its
long-term effects. 10 Yet he insists that those who opposed any interference with the common law obligations imposed on competing parties in the market economy predicated their sensibility on "the
assumption that the social relations constructed by the common-law
regime of contract and property were essentially fair and liberty loving
- or at least would be in the United States, with its expansive frontier."11 As Gillman acknowledges, however, despite the Framers' vision of social relations grounded in fairness and liberty, the
"Constitution set up a political structure specifically designed to nurture and protect the social relations produced by capitalism by
preventing the state from taking sides in the disputes arising among or
between competing classes" (p. 33).
Unfortunately, Gillman never adequately follows up on the freemarket implications of these statements or their affinity with views expressed by other commentators that the Lochner-era Justices' reliance
on the common law and affi.rmance of the status quo was in effect a
form of laissez-faire constitutionalism. 12 In tracing the transformation
of the founders' ideology into constitutional police powers jurispru10. Pp. 26-27 ("The common law established a set of class identities and class interests
linked to the ownership of different types of property (slaves, land, capital, the tools of one's
trade, commodities) and the enjoyment of the rights and privileges associated with such
ownership.").
11. P. 27. In other words, common law obligations, such as rights of contract and debtorcreditor laws, were considered just and natural even when enforced against certain groups in
society because it was presumed that America's abundance would not result in any class suffering
under conditions of dependency for long.
12. For a discussion along these lines, see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 876-83, 903 (suggesting
that the Lochner-era approach was a failure precisely because the "Lochner Court chose the
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dence during the period of Jacksonian democracy, Gillman chooses to
ignore almost completely the judicial commitment to market liberty in
order to focus more narrowly on the extent to which state courts developed the founders' aversion to factional and class-based politics.
Curiously, having recognized that these two commitments are really
two sides of the same coin, Gillman apparently felt it necessary to
redress some perceived imbalance in the current scholarship by minimizing or ignoring any free market implications in his account of the
history of police powers jurisprudence, to the point of largely omitting
the expression laissez-faire itself from his discussion.
Gillman does, however, provide a partial definition of the Jacksonian ideology of "market freedom" when he stresses this political coalition's commitment to political equality and the removal of
monopolies and chartered, or artificial, economic privileges (pp. 3441). Gillman's focus, as always, is on how the judges understood and
rationalized the choices they were making. The judges who adhered,
however loosely, to Jacksonian ideology believed that governments
should be limited to making laws of a general character - uniform
and universal in their operation. Government action ought not favor
one class over the other - for example, the farmer over the mechanic,
or the manufacturer over both (p. 38). Although early Supreme Court
scrutiny of the behavior of state legislatures rested uneasily on the notion of vested rights and the narrow protection of private property, 13
Gillman contends that by the midnineteenth century, courts more frequently defined the boundaries of the police powers by emphasizing
"the illegitimacy of so-called unequal, partial, class, or special legislation; that is, legislation which advanced the interests of only a part of
the community." 14 With the barrier of vested rights eroding and the
greater acceptance in law of Jacksonian politics aimed at releasing
market energies, Gillman suggests, courts had begun to demand that
legislation be justified on the grounds that it contributed to the general
welfare (pp. 48-49).
As an example, Gillman cites the Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision in Vandine's Case, 15 in which the court upheld a Boston bylaw that prohibited all persons, except those with licenses, from removing "any house-dirt, refuse, offal, filth or animal or vegetable
status quo, as reflected in market ordering under the common law system, as the baseline for
measurement of departures from neutrality and of action and inaction").
13. See Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("[A] law that takes property from A.
and gives it to B.... is against all reason and justice •••.").
14. P. 49. Gillman suggests that the "Jacksonian conception of classlessness and commercial
development was largely a reaction to the assumptions that drove Marshall's jurisprudence." P.
47. As an example of Justice Marshall's jurisprudence, Gillman offers Marshall's opinion in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), which protected
established charters of incorporation from legislative interference.
15. 23 Mass. (6 Pick) 187 (1828).
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substance from any of the dwellinghouses or other places occupied by
the inhabitants." 16 The court agreed that the proper test in determining the validity of this ordinance was whether this restraint of trade
"reasonably" advanced the general welfare, that is, whether it was
"necessary for the good government of the society" (p. 51). In making
this determination the court looked to both the object and the necessity of the bylaw. Gillman suggests that the court's concern was not
the extent to which the bylaw impaired market freedom but rather
whether it advanced the "general welfare of the community" and not
the "particular welfare of private interests" (pp. 51-52).
Similarly, in Bank of the State v. Cooper, 17 the Tennessee Supreme
Court invalidated an act that created a special court to handle all lawsuits brought against the Bank of the State of Tennessee. The court
stressed that the "law of the land" meant a general public law and that
this provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting any
law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at the same time
the rights of all others in similar circumstances were equally affected by
it. If the law be general in its operation, affecting all alike, the minority
are safe .... 18

Gillman contends that cases such as these contributed to the development in the nineteenth century of a constitutional jurisprudence "organized around the core value of equality under the law" and the
requirement that legislatures qemonstrate a legitimate "public purpose." 19 As a limit on government, Gillman argues, public purpose
did not mean laissez-faire; instead it meant class-neutral legislation
that did not impose special burdens or benefits on market competitors.
Gillman points out that judges in this period upheld inspection and
public health laws, location restrictions for certain dangerous or unhealthy businesses, regulations of weights and measures, licensing
schemes, and prohibition acts (p. 55). He contends that the issue for
judges faced with a regulation was whether it was arguably neutral
with regard to the various interests or groups competing in society.
Thomas M. Cooley, Gillman suggests, was perhaps the most familiar,
and most misunderstood, exponent of the conception of political legitimacy that underlies this standard of legal review (pp. 55-56). Though
Cooley was a proponent of market liberty and the protection of contract and property rights, his treatise on constitutional limitations rec16. 23 Mass. (6 Pick) at 187-92.
17. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 529 (1831).
18. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 535-36. In striking down the law, the court wrote, "This law only
acts upon individual cases, and is the same in principle as if a law had been passed in favor of
some one merchant, enabling him, by the method therein prescribed, to take judgment against
his debtors without the right of appeal." 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 536.
19. Pp. 54-56; see also Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (reflecting on
"that principle of constitutional law which prohibits unequal and partial legislation upon general
subjects").
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ognized that property rights are " 'subject to those general regulations
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare' " 20 and
that the " 'dimensions of the government's police power are identical
with the dimensions of the government's duty to protect and promote
the public welfare.' "21
With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts for
the first time began to scrutinize the day-to-day legislation that state
judges had been ruling on prior to the Civil War. Gillman argues convincingly that the Supreme Court consistently drew upon the standards developed by the state courts when it attempted to elaborate on
the limits of police powers legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 62-75). In doing so, he looks to the language employed by
the Court in opinions such as the Slaughter-house Cases 22 and Loan
Assn. v. City ofTopeka. 23 Gillman contends that the Court's insistence
that laws be "reasonable" and its antagonism toward legislation identified as "arbitrary," meaning factional, together indicate the Court's
adoption of a police powers jurisprudence that approved of class-neutral policies that advanced a public purpose (pp. 72-73, 104-31).
Gillman next presents an effective if brief survey of the history of
industrialization and the social and economic revolution that took
place in the latter half of the nineteenth century (pp. 76-86). He discusses how the rise of trade union activity and the proliferation of
collective action raised the specter of factional or class politics for
courts still captured by an ideology focusing on the general welfare
and insisting on government neutrality with respect to private interests. State courts responded to the increase in labor legislation by
steadfastly insisting that it have some relationship to a public purpose
(pp. 86-99). Here, however, the author's discussion does not go far
enough. Although Gillman may be correct that state courts in this
period were motivated more by their aversion to what they believed
20. 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH

REsT UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1224 (8th ed.
1927) (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851)); seep. 57.
21. 2 CoOLEY, supra note 20, at 1226 (quoting Leonard v. State, 127 N.E. 464, 465 (Ohio
1919)); seep. 57.
22. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Gillman compares the language of the majority opinion,
which upheld a state-created slaughterhouse monopoly as consistent with the state's police power
to protect the health of the citizenry, see 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62-66, with the language of the
dissenting Justices, who objected to the monopoly as special privilege legislation. See 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 87 (Field, J., dissenting), 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see pp. 64-67.
23. 87 U.S. 655, 659, 664-65 (1874) (invalidating a state law authorizing municipalities to
issue bonds or lend their credit to aid manufacturing enterprises on the grounds that such enterprises were not of a "public character" but were only "private interest[s]"); see pp. 67-68. Gillman also discusses Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), in which the Court upheld a
prohibition on the sale of oleomargarine because the prohibition was a good faith effort "to
protect the public health and to prevent the adulteration of dairy products," 127 U.S. at 683-84,
and because it applied equally to everyone engaged in the business. 127 U.S. at 687; see pp. 7375.
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was class politics than by any particular adherence to strict laissezfaire constitutionalism, he does not adequately explain why judges
continued to maintain an ideology that was becoming so obviously
anachronistic. Gillman's only suggestion appears to be that they were
dominated by an "ideological barrier" and that they were "institutionally obligated to preserve the dominant vision" (p. 99).
Gillman suggests that it was only over time and because of the
onslaught of a "new realism" regarding the conditions and realities of
American economic life that the Supreme Court began to reevaluate
its commitment to the tradition of neutrality (pp. 132-93). Until that
point, Gillman claims, the Court was only willing to uphold protective
or special legislation because of the particularly dangerous health conditions of a specific group of workers, 24 or because the class of workers
lacked the capacity to fend for themselves, as for example, young children, insane persons, and women. 25 As Gillman puts it, the issue for
the Court was not whether a labor statute interfered with market freedom per se but whether it could be justified as something other than
class legislation.26
The author suggests that precisely this "heightened sense of class
conflict and careful scrutiny of exercises of the police powers" (p. 125)
led a majority of the Court to strike down the maximum hours law for
bakers in Lochner v. New York 27 Gillman takes seriously the debate
between the majority and the Harlan-led dissenters28 in Lochner as to
whether the law could be justified on health grounds, suggesting that it
reflected their commitment to a well-defined police powers jurisprudence. In this regard, Gillman contends that Justice Holmes's lone
dissent was "somewhat beside the point" in that it failed to address the
central terms of the debate among the other Justices (p. 131).
Gillman's account offers convincing evidence that the Lochner era
should not be understood as being dominated by some "ill-defined
commitment to laissez-faire in the abstract" (p. 174) and that the opinions in this period flowed from "an overarching set of well-established
legal doctrines and principles governing the legitimate exercise of police powers" that distinguished between valid health laws and illegiti24. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1897) (upholding a Utah labor law restricting
miners to an eight-hour day); see p. 125 ("Holden stood for the proposition that the police powers could be used not only to promote the general well-being of the con;imunity but also the
specific physical well-being of a class of workers who were not in a position to make contracts
favorable to their health and safety.").
25. See pp. 120-21, 137-38.
26. See pp. 97, 174-75, 199.
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a defense of Lochner on this point, see Richard A. Epstein, SelfInterest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 153, 157 (1987), suggesting that "[d]ecisions
such as Lochner v. New York were correct because New York's maximum-hour legislation was
vintage special-interest legislation."
28. Justices White and Day concurred in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. 198 U.S. at 65.
Justice Holmes dissented alone. 198 U.S. at 74.
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mate class legislation (p. 177). On a theoretical level, however,
Gillman's treatment of the debate surrounding Lochner is not as sophisticated or as subtle as it needs to be. His failure to define exactly
what he means by "laissez-faire economics" or to pursue the underlying free-market implications of the ideology he traces is particularly
troublesome. Only occasionally does the reader become aware that
Gillman is arguing against a rather absolute definition of laissez-faire
ideology29 that makes no allowances for differences among the Justices
of the period. 30 This failure is disappointing because Gillman is in fact
engaging in an important redefinition of Lochner-era laissez-faire constitutionalism, even though he has chosen to posit his account against
the straw man embodied by the Holmesian paradigm. 31
These theoretical weaknesses should not obscure the important
contribution that The Constitution Besieged makes to our understanding of the historical development of police powers jurisprudence, including its roots in the framing of the Constitution, its refinement in
the state courts, and its eventual adoption by the Supreme Court after
the Civil War. Although he does not address the theoretical and analytic implications of the Lochner era for modem constitutionalism, 32
Gillman does provide a compelling account of the way state judges
and the Supreme Court.in this period understood and portrayed their
antagonism to the class legislation that threatened government neutrality, and of how the sweep of industrialism and social realism finally
convinced the Court of just how anachronistic its police powers jurisprudence had become.
-

C. Ian Anderson

29. For example, Gillman at one point suggests that the "central distinction" of this period's
jurisprudence was
based not on judgments about whether laws burdened free enterprise a lot or a little, but on
judgments about whether interventions in market relations were related to a historically
defined conception of the public purpose or instead were better understood as corrupt attempts by particular classes to gain unfair and unnatural advantages over their market
adversaries.
P. 193 (emphasis added).
30. Cf. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition. 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6-23 (1991) (discussing three approaches to Lochner-era substantive
due process in terms of Justices who were either strict laissez-faire constitutionalists, moderate
laissez-faire constitutionalists, or liberal constitutionalists).
31. For example, while some commentators continue to attribute the Lochner decision to the
influence of social Darwinism, as reflected by laissez-faire economics, see, e.g., KENS, supra note
3, at 165, others argue today that this view greatly exaggerates the influence of such concepts on
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 418 (1988) ("There is painfully little evidence that any members
of the Supreme Court were Social Darwinists, or for that matter even Darwinian.").
32. For a discussion of Lochner's modem implications, see generally Sunstein, supra note 2.

